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1 Introduction
Host countries of foreign direct investment (FDI) face an important trade-oﬀ.
They compete in attempting to attract new FDI, and at the same time they
would like to extract revenue from their acquired stock of FDI. We study the
dynamics of this trade-oﬀ, taking into account that old capital depreciates
slowly, new investment in each period is determined as the outcome of fiscal
competition, and the location of old capital may oﬀer agglomeration benefits
to new capital. We analyse both uniform taxation and diﬀerential treatment
between old capital and new investment and ask whether tax competition will
generally preserve and perpetuate existing patterns of capital agglomeration
or whether intensified tax competition may cause deagglomeration and make
agglomeration of capital a transitory state.
The main findings are as follows. First, uniform taxation of old (immo-
bile) and new (still mobile) capital causes old FDI to have a strategic eﬀect
on competition. The country with substantial amounts of old FDI is reluc-
tant to choose a low tax. The country without a stock of old capital is more
"lean and hungry". It does not sacrifice tax revenue on immobile old capital
when choosing a low tax. The strategic implications are similar in nature
to those analysed in the context of tax competition for mobile and immobile
tax bases in a static framework (as in Janeba and Peters 1999, and Marceau,
Mongrain and Wilson 2007). Our dynamic framework raises additional is-
sues, as attracting the new FDI in a given period will alter the incentives for
competition in future periods, but the intution from a static analysis carries
over: the country with the high stock of old (immobile) capital chooses a
higher expected tax rate than its competitor. Moreover, both countries win
the new investment in a given period with positive probability. Even though
countries cannot choose discriminatory taxes and must choose the same tax
rate to apply to old capital and new investment, the expected tax burden on
old capital tends to be higher than the expected tax burden on new invest-
ment. Moreover, the vintage property of capital prevents tax competition
between the countries from becoming a race to the bottom.1
Second, and less anticipated by previous static considerations, our analy-
sis facilitates an examination of agglomeration advantages: new FDI may
have a cost advantage if the investment occurs in a country which has a high
stock of old FDI already. We find that this cost advantage will generally
stabilize the role of being the country with the higher stock of FDI, but that
1We also generalize this framework to competition between more than two countries
and consider finite relocation cost for old capital instead of perfect immobility.
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the agglomeration of capital remains a transitory state. A country could
perfectly prevent a shift of the agglomeration to a competitor and could per-
petuate the agglomeration advantage by way of its tax policy. However, such
behavior does not emerge in the MPE. Instead, a country is too tempted
to extract revenue from the existing stock of capital. In the mixed strategy
MPE that emerges the country that accumulated FDI previously is more
likely to lose it in the next period than it is to keep it. The greater the
agglomeration advantage enjoyed by the country with the high stock of old
FDI, the lower the tax rates of both countries in equilibrium and the lower
the expected discounted value of tax revenues accruing to the two countries.
Hence, an agglomeration advantage may intensify tax competition.
A third aspect considered is the interaction between tax competition and
subsidies for new FDI. Political arguments are often advanced that agglomer-
ation advantages need to be nurtured to be sustained. In our framework, an
agglomeration advantage is beneficial for the country that has it. However,
in the equilibrium the country is willing to risk losing this advantage for ben-
efits in the short run. Historically, agglomeration and technology leadership
sometimes shifted but not very frequently.2 Recent changes in international
openness and fiscal competition may make the question more relevant. The
new member states of the European Union choose taxes on corporate income
that are far below the average rates that apply to the European Union as a
whole. Also, these new accession countries do not have a large stock of old
FDI. Hence, they do not pay a high price in terms of reducing the tax rates
on the previously attracted FDI or their capital base more generally if they
reduce their tax rates. Intensified fiscal competition may shift agglomeration
away from the "old" location in the capital rich member states towards the
new member states in the future. We show that whether this is the case or
not generally depends on whether countries can separate the fiscal burden
on old capital from the fiscal burden on new investment via subsidies paid
to new investors. We show that such subsidies should make agglomeration
more stable, but should erode the amount of fiscal revenue (net of subsidies)
that emerges in the MPE.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we survey related literature.
2A famous example is the shift of technology leadership in the context of the Dyestuﬀs
Industries and the emergence of leadership in Germany in the late 19th century. Historians
describe the success of the Dyestuﬀs industry in Germany as being brought about by
several factors, including lenient patent laws, the interaction between research and industry
and considerable public investment in chemical laboratories (see Murmann and Homburg
2001 and Harhoﬀ 2007).
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In Section 3 we describe the framework of our formal analysis. Section 4
solves for an MPE and its comparative static results. Section 5 considers
investment subsidies as an additional instrument of competition. Section 6
concludes.
2 Related literature
Several analyses of FDI focus on the long-term relationship between the in-
vestor and the host country in the absence of inter-country competition.
They focus on the implications of the host country’s opportunistic incentives
to expropriate the investment once it is made, and on the lack of investment
that may result if investors anticipate this behavior. Eaton and Gersowitz
(1983) were first to address this problem formally and showed that equilibria
with tacit collusion can solve the problem if the government is suﬃciently
patient.3 The aspect of inter-country competition comes into play in Janeba
(2000) who shows that building up excess capacity in diﬀerent countries may
allow a multinational enterprise to react elastically to extortionary taxa-
tion by shifting its production and profits to the locations with low taxes.
Janeba’s intriguing mechanism is related in spirit to Kehoe (1989) who ar-
gues that tax competition between regions may resolve the hold-up problems
in the context of time consistent capital taxation. In our framework the FDI
and the profits it generates become perfectly immobile once the investment
is in place, but a country that attracted the FDI in the past must decide
how much tax to extract from this immobile base, knowing that a choice of
a high tax makes it less likely that it will win the ongoing competition for
new FDI.
Three other lines of literature are closely related to our analysis. First,
Kind et al. (2000) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) study tax competition
if capital is initially agglomerated in one of the countries. In their frameworks
the country with the agglomeration advantage may preserve this advantage
by applying ’limit taxes’. We show that, in a dynamic context with new FDI
3This paper initiated much further research on this issue. Further contributions con-
taining brief surveys are Thomas and Worrall (1994) and Konrad and Lommerud (2001).
A recent empirical study of outright expropriation or nationalization of FDI and a brief
literature overview is provided by Duncan (2006). Our focus is more on the "cold" expro-
priation that occurs via extortionary taxation, as in Schnitzer (1999) who considers the
role of control rights of the investor. The potential profitability loss that results from a
transfer of control rights in connection with expropriation may deter such expropriation,
but is less eﬀective in limiting "cold expropriation" by extortionary taxation.
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in each period, the vintage nature of investment may cause the agglomeration
advantage of a country to be transitory. Our analysis therefore leads to a
diﬀerent prediction about the intertemporal sustainability of agglomeration
advantages and may provide an explanation for why regions or countries
may lose their agglomeration advantages over time. The vintage structure
of investment in our framwork is similar to the ’overlapping generations‘
structure in the multi-period finite horizon model of Holmes (1999). He shows
that agglomeration at a geographic location that has a natural disadvantage
compared to another location may exhibit a drift and move to the geographic
location that has the natural advantage, if this advantage is high enough.
However, he does not address tax policy or the strategic dynamic interaction
and competition between governments.
Second, more recently, a small literature on tax competition with stocks
of capital and flows of investment has emerged. Wildasin (2003) and Hat-
field (2006) consider dynamic capital taxation as an optimal control problem.
Countries try to extract tax revenue from an imperfectly mobile capital stock
that is partially owned by foreigners. These approaches are in continuous
time. This literature does not consider a time structure of invested capital
that results in the strictly positive tax revenues of our Markov perfect equilib-
rium, and does not allow for the vintage dynamics, temporary asymmetries
and random oscillation of capital agglomeration.
Third, our analysis is related to problems that have been studied in
Bertrand markets with subsets of price sensitive and loyal or uninformed cus-
tomers, building on the fundamental insights in Varian (1980). Narasimhan
(1988) examines a version of the static Varian model with asymmetric loyal
customer bases.4 Padilla (1995) extends this framework to an infinite horizon
allowing for overlapping generations of customers and finite switching costs.5
In the absence of agglomeration advantages, our equilibria are similar to those
specified by Padilla for switching costs above a critical value.6 Anderson et
al. (2004) correct Padilla’s analysis for switching costs below this critical
4See also Baye et al. (1992) who extend the Narasimhan analysis to n firms. Wang
(2004), Anderson and Konrad (2001) and Marceau, Mongrain and Wilson (2007) consider
tax competition in finite horizon games with mobile and immobile tax bases, leading to
equilibria similar to those in Narasimhan (1988).
5Farrell and Shapiro (1988) construct a dynamic model similar to that of Padilla (1995)
but examine sequential, rather than simultaneous, price setting. See Deneckere et al.
(1992) for a critique of the claimed endogeneity of sequential price setting in the Farrrell-
Shapiro model.
6These correspond to the equilibria of Padilla’s (1995, p.525) Theorem 1, part b.
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value.7 , 8 Although the nature of the pricing equilibrium in mixed strategies
that emerges from Padilla’s analysis is similar to the mixed strategies that
result in our problem of FDI competition in the absence of agglomeration ad-
vantages, to our knowledge, there is no corresponding work in the industrial
organization literature that combines both lock-in and the type of network or
agglomeration eﬀects that arise in this paper.9 In this sense, our analysis is
novel not just to the literature on tax competition but also to the analogous
problem of price setting with switching costs and network eﬀects.
3 The formal framework
We consider a dynamic framework with an infinite number of periods t =
1, 2, .... There are two countries, A and B, each with an infinite life span.
In each period one foreign investor it arrives and decides whether to locate
a unit of FDI in country A or in country B. We denote this decision as
it ∈ {A,B}. The investment exists for two periods and cannot relocate. If
it = B in period t, this investment is also located in B in period t+ 1. The
investment depreciates and disappears at the end of period t+1. Accordingly,
in each period there is one old unit of FDI that is located either in A or in
B, and one newly arriving unit of FDI that is perfectly mobile between
A and B. A unit of FDI generates profit in each of the two periods and
completely depreciates after that. The profits in each period are exogenously
given for each investment. Moreover, there is a cost of investment in the
first period of FDI. This cost may depend on the choice of location. We
assume that the cost is lower if the FDI locates in the country in which there
is already one active unit of FDI, and the cost saving that occurs in this
case, compared to investing in the other country, is equal to ∆ ≥ 0. This
cost saving is called the agglomeration advantage. If ∆ = 0, then there is no
agglomeration advantage. The FDI’s profit is then fully independent of the
7The analysis by Anderson et al. (2004) pertains to the incorrect specification of
equilibria in Padilla’s Theorem 1, part a.
8Chen and Rosenthal (1996) consider a dynamic duopoly in which each firm has loyal
customers in a given period, but the low-price firm in that period gains a loyal customer in
the next period at the expense of its rival. Although the equilibria examined in this model
exhibit qualitative similarities to those in Padilla (1995) and Anderson et al. (2004), the
model diﬀers in that there are no price sensitive (mobile) consumers always willing to
purchase from the lower price firm in a given period.
9See Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a very recent survey of competition with switch-
ing costs and network eﬀects.
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location choice. If ∆ > 0, then the country which attracted the investment
it−1 in period t− 1 has an agglomeration advantage in period t: everything
else equal, the firm making the investment decision prefers to invest in the
country which attracted the investment in the previous period, due to the cost
savings. This cost saving can refer to a number of factors that are typically
associated with agglomeration advantages, including technological spillovers
from the investment in place to the newly arriving investment.10 Given these
assumptions, in the absence of governmental policy, FDI is attracted by the
region which attracted investment in the past. However, the governments in
both regions are active players and we turn to their action space next.
Countries simultaneously choose taxes TA(t) and TB(t), respectively, at
the beginning of each period t, prior to the location choice of newly arriving
FDI. These taxes are constrained from above by Tj ∈ [0, r] with r suﬃciently
small compared to the profits from FDI to make FDI always attractive and
the investor’s participation constraint non-binding. These taxes are non-
discriminatory in the sense that the tax Tj(t) that is chosen by country j for
period t applies to all FDI which resides in j in this period, both old FDI
that located in j already in period t − 1, and new FDI that locates in j in
period t.
Investors’ payoﬀs are determined by their exogenous profits in the two
periods of their activity, by the set-up costs for FDI in the first period of
activity, by the taxes they have to pay, and by their discount rate that
makes first and second period payments comparable. We assume that all
investors and governments have the same common discount rate, expressed
by a common discount factor equal to δ ∈ [0, 1), which is taken as time
invariant and exogenous. Accordingly, if it locates in A, then investor it’s
payoﬀ is
πit(A) =
½
G− TA(t) +∆− δTA(t+ 1) if it−1 located in A
G− TA(t)− δTA(t+ 1) if it−1 located in B,
(1)
with G exogenously given. Investor it’s payoﬀ of locating in B is obtained
analogously.
The determination of the objectives of governments in tax competition
frameworks is a more delicate matter. Within our restricted framework, we
10Several microfoundations for ∆ could be given, based on trade cost, knowledge
spillovers, labor market externalities and others. For a short survey and further references
see Devereux, Griﬃth and Simpson (2007). Strange, Hejazi and Tang (2006) emphasize
coping with uncertainty as a common denominator of several agglomeration advantages
that have been identified.
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assume that a government’s payoﬀ is equal to the present value of its revenues
from taxing FDI. The normative basis for this assumption is that even a
government that aims at maximizing the social welfare in the respective
country would like to extract tax revenue from FDI, because foreigners bear
the burden of these taxes, and their utility should not enter the objective
function of a government that aims to maximize the welfare of its citizens.
Accordingly, country j’s objective function at a given period t is
θt−1(Tj(t)) +
∞X
k=t
θk(Tj(k) + δTj(k + 1))δ
k−t (2)
with θk = 1 if ik = j and θk = 0 otherwise.
Before characterizing and restricting the players’ sets of strategies, we
characterize the set of histories of the game in diﬀerent periods. Assuming
that, in period t = 1, one investor had already chosen its location i0, the se-
quence of actions that is described in section 3 establishes possible histories at
any point in time. When countries make their tax choices at the beginning of
period t, a history is a sequence of actions ht = {i0, (TA(1), TB(1), i1), ..., (TA(t−
1), TB(t − 1), it−1)}, and all feasible histories at period t constitute the ele-
ments of the set Ht. Accordingly, a pure local strategy of country j at period
t is a mapping Tj(ht, t) from Ht into [0, r]. Similarly, when the investor who
arrives at the beginning of period t chooses its investment location, the map-
ping it is a mapping fromHt×[0, r]×[0, r] into {A,B} that assigns a location
choice to each feasible (ht, TA(t), TB(t)). In this framework the set of possible
equilibrium outcomes is typically very large. However, it is natural to restrict
the strategy space and to look at Markov perfect equilibria (MPE). For this
purpose we restrict the set of behavioral strategies of countries and investors
to those which employ local strategies in each period t as follows. Countries
choose Tj(it−1) ∈ [0, r], solely as a function of the location decision of investor
it−1 in period t − 1, who either invested in country A or in country B. We
allow countries to employ local randomization, described by their cumula-
tive distribution functions Fj(it−1), j = A,B, with support [0, r]. Note that,
by construction, these mappings are not dependent on the historical time
period and these restrictions require that all histories that lead to the same
investment decision it−1 are mapped into the same tax choices by countries
(with possible mixing) in period t. Similarly, we restrict the set of behavioral
strategies of investors as follows. The investor who chooses the location of
FDI at the beginning of period t makes its location choice as a function of
(it−1, TA(t), TB(t)). These restrictions require that all histories that lead to
the same investment decision it−1 and tax rate choices TA(t) and TB(t) are
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mapped into the same investment choices by the investor it that chooses the
location of FDI in the respective period t. By construction, these mappings
are also not dependent on the time period.
4 Markov perfect equilibrium
We now consider the equilibrium tax choices of the governments. We de-
termine the net fiscal burden that is imposed on FDI, and whether the tax
choices stabilize or destabilize a given agglomeration advantage. In order to
make this comparison, we note that the agglomeration advantage is sustained
in a laissez-faire equilibrium forever: If ∆ > 0 and Ti(t) ≡ 0, the new FDI
would always be invested in the country which has the stock of old FDI. This
is the benchmark for evaluating whether equilibrium tax policy destabilizes
or strengthens an existing agglomeration of capital.
We now turn to the equilibrium with endogenous tax policy and state our
main result:
Proposition 1 Let r > 2∆(1 + δ). (i) A MPE in stationary strategies with
positive taxes TA(i−1) and TB(i−1) exists in which
Fj(T ) =
½
(δ + 2)T + δ∆− r
(δ + 2)T + (δ − 2)∆+ rδ for T ∈ (
r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
+∆, r) (3)
and Fj(T ) = 0 for T <
r−2∆(1+δ)
δ+2 +∆ and Fj(T ) = 1 for T ≥ r, if i−1 = j,
Fj(T ) =
½
2
(δ + 2)T + 2∆(1 + δ)− r
(δ + 2)T +∆(3δ + 2) + rδ
for T ∈ [r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
, r −∆) (4)
and Fj(T ) = 0 for T <
r−2∆(1+δ)
δ+2 and Fj(T ) = 1 for T ≥ r −∆, if i−1 6= j.
(ii) If i0 = B, then the payoﬀs for A and B in period t = 1 are v∗A =
r(1+δ)−2∆
(2+δ)(1−δ)
and v∗B = 2
r−δ∆
(2+δ)(1−δ) in this equilibrium. For i0 = A the same property holds
with A replacing B and vice versa.
Proof. Consider property (i). An investor who locates his FDI in period t
anticipates that the actual FDI location in t will lead to the same expected
tax burden in t+ 1 on this investment, because the respective host country
will choose the same local tax strategy in period t+1, irrespective of whether
this host country is A or B. The location decision can, hence, be made on
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the basis of returns in period t only. In period t the agglomeration benefit
matters: investing in the country in period t that hosts the FDI made in t−1
has a cost advantage of size ∆. Therefore, if it−1 = B, then it = B if
TB(t) < TA(t) +∆. (5)
The FDI is made in A if the reverse inequality holds, and FDI may be
located in either country with equal probability if equality holds in (5). It is
important for this result that each investor appears and decides only once.
An investor whose FDI has expired its two periods of activity disappears and
will not re-appear with new FDI in the future.
Turn now to the tax choices made by countries. Note that the one-stage
deviation principle applies. To see this note that the lowest aggregate payoﬀ
for a country is bounded from below by zero. Also, the highest payoﬀ (2) of
a country is bounded from above by
2r
1− δ . (6)
Maximum feasible payoﬀ diﬀerences between arbitrary action profiles are
therefore bounded from above.
Suppose now that all future investors and countries A and B follow the
candidate equilibrium choices in all periods t+1, .... This allows us to calcu-
late the continuation value v1 at t+1 that applies for the country j for which
it = j and the continuation value v0 that applies for the country j for which
it 6= j as follows: if Tj(t+ 1) = r, the investor it+1 locates FDI not in j, but
in the other country with probability 1. As this tax choice has a positive
probability mass in the candidate equilibrium strategy for j with it−1 = j, it
must hold that
r + δv0 = v1. (7)
Second, given the equilibrium candidate strategies, country j with it = j is
indiﬀerent in period t+ 1 between choosing Tj = r and Tj = q +∆ with
q =
r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
(8)
being the lower bound of the equilibrium support for the country without
old FDI. As Tj(t) = q +∆ will attract FDI in period t with probability 1, it
must hold that
(
r − 2∆(1 + δ)
δ + 2
+∆)2 + δv1 = v1. (9)
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These two equations can be used to calculate the continuation values as
v1 = 2
r − δ∆
(δ + 2) (1− δ) (10)
and
v0 =
r(1 + δ)− 2∆
(δ + 2) (1− δ) . (11)
Consider now period t. It remains to show that the local strategies FA
and FB are mutually optimal replies. Consider first country B. Given the
candidate equilibrium choices of A, country B’s payoﬀ as a function of TB(t)
can be written as
FA(TB −∆)(TB + δv0) + (1− FA(TB −∆))(2TB + δv1) (12)
Inserting (4), (10) and (11) shows that the value of (12) is equal to v1
in (10) for all TB ∈ [q + ∆, r]. Moreover, all TB /∈ [q + ∆, r] yield a lower
payoﬀ. This makes any mixed strategy FB that has [q+∆, r] as its support an
optimal reply to FA. Turn now to the tax choices of country A, anticipating
that country B chooses FB as in (3), and the continuation values v1 and v0
as in (10) and (11). Country A’s payoﬀ as a function of TA ∈ [q, r −∆] is
FB(TA +∆)δv0 + (1− FB(TA +∆))(TA + δv1). (13)
Inserting (3), (10) and (11) shows that the value of (13) is equal to v0 in
(11) for all TA ∈ [q, r−∆) and smaller than v0 for any feasible TA /∈ [q, r−∆].
Note for completeness that (3) and (4) are cumulative distribution func-
tions, and the lower bound of taxes, q, is positive if r > 2∆(1 + δ) holds.
The payoﬀs v∗A and v
∗
B for A and B given i0 = B in this equilibrium
are equal to the continuation values v0 and v1 at t = 1 as in (11) and (10),
respectively.
The MPE involves mixed strategies. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium
mixed strategies in period t for r = 1, ∆ = 0.1 and it−1 = B both for δ = 0
(solid lines) and for δ = .9 (dashed lines). For intuition consider the case
δ = 0. The problem reduces to a sequence of static games. Each of these
is equivalent to Bertrand pricing games with loyal and non-loyal customers
as in Narasimhan (1988). For r > 2∆ there are no deterministic values of
TA and TB that are mutually optimal replies and hence no equilibrium in
pure strategies.11 An equilibrium is in mixed strategies. The equilibrium
11Consider, for instance, it−1 = B, and ∆ = 0. Country A would like to attract the
11
cumulative distribution functions in t for it−1 = B can be obtained from
(3) and (4) and δ = 0. The maximum tax charged by country B is TB = r
(which is the exogenously given maximum). Country A does not have a stock
of old FDI in this period. It will not charge a tax higher than r −∆: given
the agglomeration advantage of country B, with a tax that exceeds r − ∆
country A will not attract the new FDI. This determines the upper limit
of the support for country A and explains the flat part of FA in Figure 1.
Consider the lower limit. If country B charges TB = r on its immobile tax
base (the old FDI that located in country B), this yields tax revenue equal to
r. For this reason, B is not willing to reduce its tax to a level arbitrarily close
to zero. There is a smallest positive tax such that B is indiﬀerent between
charging TB = r on the old FDI but not attracting the new FDI in this
period, and charging this minimum tax but also attracting the new FDI in
this period with probability 1. This minimum tax yields the lower limit of
the support from which B chooses TB. Denote this limit as q +∆. Country
A will never undercut this smallest tax by more than ∆. Hence, the lower
bound of A’s support is 1
2
−∆ in Figure 1. Within the interval [1
2
−∆, r−∆],
country A randomizes as described by (4), which makes B just indiﬀerent
between all possible choices in its support. Similarly, B randomizes on the
interval [1
2
, r) as described by (3) in a way that makes A just indiﬀerent
between taxes in its support. In addition, since probabilities sum to 1, B
needs to place a mass point at TB = r.
Note that existence of this equilibrium requires that r ≥ 2∆(1 + δ). If
this condition is violated the equilibrium support for the country that does
not host the old FDI requires negative tax rates, which are ruled out.12
For a wide range of parameters only a mixed strategy equilibrium exists
(see Footnote 12), so such an equilibrium appears to be a reasonable predic-
investment in period t, and is willing to undercut any positive tax rate chosen by country
B. However, for resulting high tax rates TA, country B would like to undercut A likewise,
making TA suboptimal for A. For tax rates suﬃciently smaller than r, country B does
not undercut TA and prefers to choose TB = r. But given TB = r, a TA that is discretely
smaller than TB is, again, not an optimal reply for A.
12A MPE in pure strategies with persistent agglomeration with TI(t) = 0 for the country
I without a stock of old FDI in period t, and TJ(t) = ∆ for the country which hosts the old
FDI in period t exists in the range r ≤ 2∆/(1− δ). Hence, for the range 2∆/(1− δ) ≥ r ≥
2∆(1+ δ) a multiplicity of equilibria exists. It can be shown that this range with multiple
equilibria disappears if we allow for negative choices of T , with the dividing line between
pure-strategy equilibrium with persistent agglomeration and equilibrium with transitory
agglomeration as in Proposition 1 being defined by r = 2∆/(1 + δ). (A proof can be
obtained from the authors upon request.)
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Figure 1: Cumulative distribution functions FA and FB for TA and TB for a
period t with r = 1, ∆ = 0.1, it−1 = B, δ = 0 (solid lines) and δ = .9 (dashed
lines).
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tion for the outcome of rational choice by default. Active randomiziation of
players according to the equilibrium strategy has been advocated based on
the insight that anticipated deviations from the strategy may be exploited
by the co-players. A second justification is Harsanyi’s (1973) approach using
Bayesian equilibria to justify equilibria in mixed strategies.13
Some additional qualitative properties of the MPE in Proposition 1 are
characterized in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 The following properties hold for the MPE with cumulative
distribution functions (3) and (4): (i) The period tax burden on "old" FDI
is higher in expectation than the period tax burden on "new" FDI. (ii) The
expected tax revenue on total FDI per period is higher than r. (iii) The
probability that it = it−1 is smaller than 1/2 for small ∆ and equal to 1/4 for
∆ = 0.
Proof. The proof of property (i) uses a revealed preference argument. Let,
without loss of generality, it−1 = B . This "old" FDI is taxed by TB(t) in
period t. The "new" FDI in period t is taxed by TB(t) if it = B, and by TA(t)
if it = A. Moreover, it = A if TB(t)−∆ > TA(t). Hence, the tax burden is
the same on "old" and "new" FDI if it = it−1, and is lower (or at most the
same, which happens only if TA(t) = TB(t) and ∆ = 0) if it 6= it−1. Because
both countries randomize their tax rates independently according to (3) and
(4), outcomes with TA(t) < TB(t)−∆ happen with positive probability.
Consider (ii). The sum v0 + v1 is the present value of the sum of both
countries’ tax revenue at any given t. This sum can be written as
v0 + v1 =
r
(1− δ) +
r − 2(1 + δ)∆
(2 + δ) (1− δ) . (14)
It exceeds r
(1−δ) if r > 2∆(1 + δ). However,
r
(1−δ) is the present value of tax
revenue that emerges if, on average, the total tax revenue is equal to r in
each period, and r > 2∆(1 + δ) is the condition stated in the proposition
that is required to make the country that has no agglomeration advantage
choose a positive minimum tax in the equilibrium.
13See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole (1993, pp. 230-234). An alternative to the mixed
strategy MPE with simultaneous choices is sequential timing, as has been discussed in
Farrell and Shapiro (1988). See also Denckere et al. (1992), who critique the timing game
employed by Farrell and Shapiro. In such a game of timing the country with locked-in
investment sets tax first at rate r and the country with no old investment follows and
undercuts by ∆. The payoﬀs in this equilibrium are higher than in Proposition 1 but, if
applied to our model, relocation of the agglomeration would also occur in the equilibrium.
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Consider (iii). Suppose it−1 = B. Then using FA(T ) and FB(T ) from
Proposition 1 yields
PA wins =
Z r
∆
F 0A(x−∆)(1− FB(x))dx. (15)
It is not straightforward to find a closed form solution to this integral using
(3) and (4) in general. For ∆ = 0 the probability reduces to PA wins = 3/4.
Hence, PA wins < 1/2 for suﬃciently small ∆ follows by continuity.
In the MPE, investment is taxed more heavily when it matures. Tax
policies under which investors receive a preferential tax treatment in early
periods of investment are known as "tax holidays" and are widely studied
in the tax competition literature. The usual assumption in this context is
that countries may be able to commit to a lower tax for some time, but
their commitment power does not stretch into the indefinite future. In our
framework "tax holidays" result endogenously from the equilibrium outcome
in which countries with a stock of old FDI have a tendency to choose higher
taxes than countries with no such stock when competing for new FDI. It is
based here on a reversion-to-the-mean eﬀect: new FDI can choose the country
which exhibits the superior fiscal conditions in the period of investment. Old
FDI has to accept the conditions chosen in the respective country in which
it is located.
The putty-clay nature of FDI causes two diﬀerent eﬀects regarding the
location choice of future FDI: an incumbency eﬀect and an agglomeration
benefit eﬀect. To study the incumbency eﬀect, let ∆ = 0. In this case the
country which attracted FDI in the previous period has an immobile tax base
in the current period. Let this country be B. If B chooses a high tax, it is
likely that the tax chosen by A is lower and the FDI goes to A. A high tax
rate therefore is likely to make country B lose the mobile tax base in this
period, and this is a twofold loss: the country loses the tax revenue on this tax
base in the current period and it loses the advantage of having an immobile
tax base in the next period. The competing country A has a twofold gain
from attracting FDI in the current period, and this is a reason why country
A has a strong incentive to undercut the tax rate chosen by B: first, A does
not have an immobile tax base from previous FDI; hence, it does not lose
tax revenue on this tax base by reducing its own tax rate in a given period.
Second, a lower tax rate makes it more likely that the tax rate is suﬃciently
low to attract the new investment in that period, which can then be taxed
in the current period, and is an immobile tax base that can be taxed by
A also in the next period. The nature of this competition makes it likely
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that a country which attracted FDI in the previous period will not attract
it in the current period. Hence, investment alternates stochastically over
time. A country that attracted the investment in the previous period has an
incentive to exploit this immobile investment, and this makes the country
disadvantaged vis-a-vis the competitor without such a stock of tax base that
can be exploited. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), one may say that
the country which currently has a stock of investment is a "fat cat", whereas
its competitor has the "lean and hungry look". This analysis reveals that the
country that attracted much past investment has a strategic disadvantage.
Capture of previous investment, hence, is not only a benefit, but equilibrium
forces drive future investment away from saturated countries and towards
lean and hungry countries.
An agglomeration eﬀect comes into play if investments exhibit positive
spillovers towards each other (or towards new investment in our case), i.e., if
there are technological benefits from agglomeration, which are measured in
our framework by ∆. For the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1 it
holds that the higher the agglomeration advantage ∆ enjoyed by the coun-
try with old FDI, the lower the tax rates of both countries in equilibrium
and the lower the expected discounted value of tax revenues accruing to the
two countries. However, the diﬀerence between the present discounted value
of the tax revenues of the country possessing an agglomeration advantage
and the country competing with it for new investment, increases in the ag-
glomeration advantage ∆. Consequently, when such advantages exist, they
are valuable assets that yield benefits to the country possessing them. More
formally, we state and prove the following
Proposition 3 Suppose r > 2∆(1 + δ) and consider the equilibrium in
Proposition 1. (i) The higher the agglomeration advantage ∆ the lower the
equilibrium tax rate of each country in the sense of first order stochastic
dominance. (ii) v1 − v0 is increasing in ∆.
Proof. (i) Let it−1 = j and write the equilibrium distribution of country j
given in (3) as a function of ∆,
Fj(∆) =
(δ + 2)T + δ∆− r
(δ + 2)T + (δ − 2)∆+ rδ ≡
N
D
(16)
where N stands for numerator and D for denominator. Note that
dFj(∆)/d∆ =
δ
D
− (δ − 2)N
D2
=
δ
D
− (δ − 2)
D
Fj(∆) (17)
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It is easily verified that D is positive over the relevant range, so that sgn
(dFj(∆)/d∆) = sgn [δ− (δ− 2)Fj(∆)] > 0. Hence, the eﬀect of an increase
in the agglomeration parameter ∆ is to raise the probability that the country
with old FDI sets its tax rate below any given level T in the support of its
distribution. A similar result holds for the country with no vintage FDI. If
it−1 6= j, then from (4)
Fj(∆) = 2
(δ + 2)T + 2∆(1 + δ)− r
(δ + 2)T +∆(3δ + 2) + rδ
≡ 2N
D
(18)
where again N stands for numerator and D for denominator. Since
dFj(∆)/d∆ =
4(1 + δ)
D
− 2(3δ + 2)N
D2
=
4(1 + δ)
D
− (3δ + 2)
D
Fj(∆) (19)
and D is positive, sgn (dFj(∆)/d∆) = sgn [4(1 + δ)− (3δ + 2)Fj(∆)] > 0.
(ii) From (11) and (10) it is easily verified that v1 − v0 = r+2∆(δ+2) , which is
increasing in ∆.
In the remainder of this section we consider two modifications of the
general set-up. First, we discuss what happens if old capital is not completely
immobile and can relocate at a relocation cost c. Second, we consider the
competition between more than two countries.
Suppose first that old capital can relocate, and that this involves a relo-
cation cost c ≥ 0. The MPE in Proposition 1 is sustained if c is suﬃciently
large, for instance, c ≥ r being a suﬃcient condition. For some values of
c < r, the analysis becomes more involved. In particular, assumptions are
needed about the role of the agglomeration advantage, in particular in the
case in which tax choices in a given period may make the old capital move
to the other country. Several reasonable assumptions can be made for this
case, depending on the nature of the agglomeration advantage.14
For this reason, we focus on the case with ∆ = 0 which becomes struc-
turally equivalent to the problem studied by Padilla (1995) and Anderson et
al. (2004). They show that the nature of the equilibrium depends on the
size c relative to r. We illustrate the nature of the problem focussing on the
case with c small compared to r, making r non-binding in the equilibrium.
We focus again on the case with δ = 0, which is the limit of the more general
problem for δ → 0 and transforms the local decision problems in each period
into a static problem for investors and the governments. Then, for c < r/2
14The issue of coordination between the investors becomes potentially relevant in this
case. The decision about new investment and about relocation of old investment become
interdependent and governed by expectations.
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an MPE exists which is characterized by the following mixed strategies in
period t: If it−1 = B, then
FB(T ) =
½
T − c
T
and FA(T ) =
½
2(T − c)
T
for T ∈ [c, 2c) , (20)
with FA(T ) = FB(T ) = 0 for T < c and FA(T ) = FB(T ) = 1 for T ≥ 2c. For
it−1 = A, all subscripts A and B need to be interchanged.15
The MPE for this set of parameters is only a special case. However,
the example shows that mobility of old capital with a finite cost of mobility
may induce similar processes of stochastic relocation of agglomeration. Also,
the lock-in of old capital leads to a similar strategic disavantage of its host
country in the competition for new FDI. Further, as c→ 0, the equilibrium
converges towards Bertrand cut-throat competition for two units of perfectly
mobile capital in each period.
We return now to the general analysis with immobile old capital as de-
scribed in Section 3 and consider more than two countries.
Proposition 4 Let there be n ≥ 3 identical countries denoted A1, A2, ...An.
Let r > ∆. (i) If r ≤ 2∆/(1 − δ) ≡ r then, for it−1 = Aj, Tj(t) = ∆
and Ti(t) = 0 ∀i 6= j , ∀t > 0 constitute a MPE of the game. (ii) If
r ≥ 2∆(1+δα)
1+δα−δ ≡ r then for it−1 = Aj taxes Tj(t) = r and Ti(t) = 0 ∀i 6= j
and ∀t > 0 constitute a MPE of the game.
Proof. (i) The one-stage deviation principle applies. We consider deviations
in a single period t. With a nonnegativity constraint on taxes no country
i 6= j has an incentive to deviate from Ti(t) = 0, as any higher tax does
not attract FDI and also does not yield positive tax revenue. Consider one-
stage deviations from Tj(t) = ∆ for country j. A deviation to Tj ∈ [0,∆) is
not profitable. It reduces the payoﬀ in period t by 2(∆ − Tj) and does not
aﬀect the continuation game. A deviation to Tj > ∆ in period t generates a
discounted payoﬀ of Tj + δ0, which takes its maximum for Tj = r which is
lower than 2∆/(1− δ) if r ≤ 2∆/(1− δ) ≡ r.
15This can be confirmed either by considering δ → 0 in the more general results in
Padilla (1995) and Anderson et al. (2004), or directly, as follows: given FA(T ), the period
payoﬀ for B is equal to 2c for all TB ∈ [c, 2c] and lower than that for all other TB . Similarly,
given FB(T ), the period payoﬀ for A is equal to c for all TA ∈ [c, 2c) and lower than that
for all other TA. Note that T = 2c is the upper end of the equilibrium support, which
requires c < r/2. If capital can relocate at some cost and there is a binding upper limit r
(i.e., c ∈ (r/2, r)), this additional constraint will induce a modified equilibrium in mixed
strategies.
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To show (ii), consider the continuation values in the candidate equilib-
rium. The continuation value of the country with the old FDI in t in this
equilibrium is
r + δv0 = v1. (21)
The continuation value of a country i with no old FDI in t is
v0 = 0 + δ(αv1 + (1− α)v0) , where α ≡ (n− 1)−1. (22)
Here we assume a symmetric random tie-breaking rule: if several countries
without old capital choose the same Ti < Tj(t) − ∆, the new FDI goes to
each of them with the same probability α. Rearranging (22) we obtain
v0 =
δαv1
1− δ(1− α) . (23)
Using (23) to replace v0 in (21) and solving for v1 yields
v1 =
r
1− δ [
1 + δα− δ
1 + δα
]. (24)
By the one-stage deviation principle it is necessary and suﬃcient that any
single deviation from Tj(t) = r and Ti(t) = 0 ∀i 6= j does not increase
the player’s payoﬀ. Countries i 6= j have no incentive to deviate at period
t. Country j0s optimal deviation from Tj(t) = r is to the highest tax at
which j attracts both units of capital, which is Tj(t) = ∆ (giving ties to j).
The payoﬀ from doing so given that all countries conform to the equilibrium
strategies thereafter is 2∆+δv1. For this deviation to be deterred the following
inequality must hold: 2∆+ δv1 ≤ v1 or, inserting the right hand side of (24)
in place of v1,
r ≥ r ≡ 2∆(1 + δα)
1 + δα− δ . (25)
Consequently, a MPE in which Tj(t) = r and Ti(t) = 0 for all i 6= j exists
when r satisfies (25).
In the MPE in (i) the country in which the capital is agglomerated uses
‘limit taxes’ and this makes the agglomeration of capital permanent. In the
other MPE the agglomeration is transitory. Note that
r ≡ 2∆(1 + δα)
1 + δα− δ < 2∆/(1− δ) ≡ r. (26)
Hence, there is a range of values of r for which both types of equilibria
exist, r ≤ r ≤ r. Intuitively, if there are several countries without old
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capital, these countries are willing to compete very strongly. This can lead
to two types of MPE. If the agglomeration advantage is large compared to
the maximum tax, the country with old investment does not lose much in the
current period if it chooses a ’limit tax’ that is suﬃciently small to attract
also the new investment rather than choosing a maximum tax r, and the
country gains in the future by keeping the agglomeration of capital. In the
other MPE the agglomeration is again transitory: the country which has
the stock of old capital is better-oﬀ by extracting revenue in the present
even if this implies that the agglomeration of capital locates for some time
in another country. As a result, new investment always pays zero taxes in
the first period, and is maximally taxed in the second period when it turned
into old capital. Moreover, the agglomeration of capital always relocates to
another country in this MPE. Hence, an increase in the number of countries
can intensify competition for the agglomeration and can make a relocation
of the agglomeration even more likely.
From a policy perspective, we should note that Proposition 4 considers
a rather extreme case in which there are several countries without any cap-
ital. We would expect that Proposition 1 characterizes a situation that is
empirically more relevant.
5 Bidding for firms
We assumed so far that countries have to tax old and new FDI according to
the same rules. A country which attracted FDI in the past, hence, sacrifices
the opportunity to levy a high tax on this immobile investment if it chooses
to compete seriously for the new investment, and this caused considerable
fiscal revenues in the equilibrium in Proposition 1. When competing for
FDI, countries are often not allowed to use discriminatory taxation with
respect to old and new investment. However, they may use an additional
instrument in the competition for new investment. As has been highlighted
in the literature (e.g., Black and Hoyt 1989, Besley and Seabright 1999,
and Kessing, Konrad and Kotsogiannis 2008), countries may make upfront
transfers to new FDI, and may bid for FDI much like in a standard auction.16
16In the industrial economics literature, Chen (1997) employs a duopoly model with
locked-in customers to compare uniform pricing and discriminatory pricing policies that
oﬀer a discount to new customers switching from the other firm. Chen’s model diﬀers
from that examined in this section in that it is a two-period model in which all customers
are locked into one or the other firm and customer switching costs are drawn from a
nondegenerate distribution.
20
This second instrument will generally change the nature of the equilibrium
and may erode the fiscal net revenue that remains to countries.
To analyse this more formally, we enlarge set of actions of countries in
each period. Each country chooses the tax Tj(t) ∈ [0, r] that applies to any
old and new FDI that is located in country j in the given period, and also
it makes a bid Sj(t) ∈ [0, k] to the new investor in the respective period t.
Here, k is an exogenous constant, suﬃciently large to be non-binding, but
finite. For instance, any k ≥ 2r + ∆ is a suitable limit. This changes the
period payoﬀs of countries. Let, e.g., it−1 = B. Then the payoﬀ of country
B in period t is TB(t) if it = A, and 2TB(t)−SB(t) if it = B, and the period
payoﬀ of A is TA(t)− SA(t) if it = A and zero otherwise.
Moreover, given it−1 = B, a foreign direct investor’s total payoﬀ is equal
to G+∆+SB(t)−TB(t)−δTB(t+1) if it = B, and it is equal to G+SA(t)−
TA(t)− δTA(t+1) if it = A. Accordingly, anticipating the future tax burden
in the country of location, the investor will locate the FDI in the country with
higher payoﬀ. For equal payoﬀs we apply here a more specific tie-breaking
rule and assume that, if the payoﬀs are equal, the investor locates in the
country which has the agglomeration advantage.
Strategy sets, histories, and a restriction to Markov perfect strategies fol-
low straightforwardly from these assumptions, and we can state the following
proposition
Proposition 5 Suppose r > 2∆(1 + δ) and let i0 = B. Then a Markov
perfect equilibrium exists in which T ∗A(t) = T
∗
B(t) = r, and S
∗
j (t) = δ(r +
∆) + r − ∆ if it−1 = j, and S∗j (t) = δ(r + ∆) + r if it−1 6= j, for all
t = 1, 2, .... The payoﬀs in this equilibrium are v∗A = 0 and v
∗
B = r +∆.
Proof. Note first that the one-stage deviation principle applies also for the
augmented framework for analogous reasons. Consider now the decision of
an investor at t. As both countries charge the same tax in period t + 1,
regardless of it, the investor can base the location decision on a comparison
of period t payoﬀs. There are savings in investment of ∆ from investing
in it−1. Let it−1 = B. Then it = B if and only if SB(t) − TB(t) + ∆ ≥
S∗A(t) − T ∗A(t). Continuation play in periods t + s for s = 1, 2, ... as in the
candidate equilibrium in Proposition 5 yields continuation values for the
countries as vA = 0 and vB = r + ∆ if it = B, and vA = r + ∆ and
vB = 0 if it = A. Let it−1 = B. Suppose that B anticipates T ∗A(t) = r and
S∗A(t) = δ(r + ∆) + r. Then the payoﬀ of B becomes equal to TB(t) if
SB(t) − TB(t) + ∆ < S∗A(t) − T ∗A(t), and equal to 2TB(t) − SB(t) + δv1, if
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SB(t) − TB(t) + ∆ ≥ S∗A(t) − T ∗A(t). Among the latter choices, the payoﬀ
maximizing choice is SB(t)−TB(t) = δ(r+∆)−∆ = δ(r+∆)+ r− r−∆ =
S∗B(t)− T ∗B(t). We now turn to country A. The payoﬀ of A is equal to zero
for all SA(t) − TA(t) ≤ S∗B(t) − T ∗B(t) + ∆. Moreover, the payoﬀ for A is
negative for all SA(t)−TA(t) > δv1 = δ(r+∆) = δ(r+∆)+ r−∆− r+∆ =
S∗B(t)− T ∗B(t) +∆. This completes the proof.
Proposition 5 shows that the high tax revenue outcome in the tax com-
petition equilibrium of Proposition 1 is a consequence of a lack of a suﬃcient
number of fiscal instruments. If the countries have as many instruments as
there are types of tax bases, then the competition between countries again
becomes cut-throat in nature. This result is not unexpected and confirms
the intuition that diﬀerential taxation of tax bases with diﬀerent elasticities
tends to strengthen tax competition, as, for instance, in Janeba and Peters
(1999) and Haupt and Peters (2005).
Contrasting this result with piecemeal evidence in the European Union
on tax and subsidy competition shows that further aspects need to be taken
into consideration to explain the success of new member states in attracting
new FDI. A possible explanation for this success, despite the forces which
are described in Proposition 5, is the co-funding of infrastructure investment
that takes place inside the European Union as part of their development and
cohesion objectives.
Proposition 5 also highlights the interaction between the number of avail-
able fiscal instruments and the agglomeration eﬀect. In the absence of subsi-
dization, from Proposition 4 we know that an increase in the agglomeration
eﬀect ∆ lowers the present discounted value of tax revenues for both coun-
tries in the equilibrium that is characterized in Proposition 1. Proposition 5
shows the reverse; an increase in the agglomeration eﬀect ∆ raises the dis-
counted value of net revenues of the country with old FDI and has no eﬀect
on the value of net revenues for the competing country, which are zero. This
arises because, in the presence of two instruments, competition for new FDI
is decoupled from revenues extracted from old FDI. Due to the immobility
of old FDI, the host country can reap the complete hold-up benefit, r. At the
same time, perfect Bertrand-like tax competition for new FDI drives the re-
turn from that FDI to ∆ for the host country with agglomeration advantages
and zero for its rival.
The result shows that the restrictions on subsidies paid to new FDI may
moderate tax competition for FDI within Europe and may prevent a ’race to
the bottom’. It reveals a possible channel by which tax competition that is
complemented by countries’ bidding for FDI may lead to higher average tax
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revenues but lower fiscal net revenues than if such bids are not feasible. The
aggregate tax revenues in the equilibrium in Proposition 5 are equal to 2r in
each period, and are smaller than 2r in the equilibrium that is characterized
in Proposition 1. However, the present value of all aggregate fiscal net rev-
enues of all future periods is equal to r +∆ in the equilibrium with bidding
for FDI, and the expression in (14) in the equilibrium in Proposition 1. An
immediate implication of the comparison of the present value of aggregate
fiscal net revenues under the two regimes is the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Suppose r > 2∆(1 + δ). The present discounted value of
aggregate fiscal net revenues is higher with a single instrument (Tj(t)) (in
the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1), than with two instruments
(Tj(t) and Sj(t)) (in the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 5), if and
only if r > ∆(4+δ(1−δ))
(1+δ)2 .
This observation is interesting from an empirical point of view. Empiri-
cally the relationship between capital mobility, eﬀective marginal tax rates,
and fiscal net revenues is not straightforward. For instance, sustained or
even increasing tax revenue has been observed jointly with a reduction in
marginal tax rates.17 If the increased competition for FDI has been comple-
mented with a change in the number or composition of instruments, sustained
or even increasing tax revenue does not preclude a drop in fiscal net revenue.
As shown in Proposition 6, for δ suﬃciently large, two instruments generate
less fiscal revenue than one. At the same time, the average statutory tax
rates are higher than in the case with only one tax instrument.
6 Discussion
We considered fiscal competition for FDI in a dynamic framework. We ac-
counted for a number of properties: FDI is mobile ex-ante and can react to
the fiscal conditions that apply in diﬀerent countries. It becomes immobile
and potentially subject to extortionary taxation once it is in place while it
depreciates over time.We also allowed for a cost advantage from investing in
the country that hosts earlier investment.
Our main findings are the following. First, we confirm an insight from
static analysis: a country’s acquired stock of immobile FDI is a mixed bless-
ing. On the one hand, the country can extort this immobile tax base. On
17Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002), for instance, address the puzzle that corporate
tax revenue did not decrease, despite decreases in tax rates.
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the other hand, such extortionary taxes will aﬀect newly acquired FDI. The
temptation to extort the immobile tax base is a strategic disadvantage in the
tax competition for new FDI. As a result, the country which has accumu-
lated a stock of immobile FDI at the beginning of a period will, on average,
charge a higher tax, and is likely to lose the agglomeration advantage to a
country without a stock of immobile FDI. Second, in the dynamic equilib-
rium a frequent change in the agglomeration advantage between countries
will be observed along the equilibrium path. These theoretical results ap-
pear to be consistent with empirical results by Dumais, Ellison and Glaeser
(2002). They recognize (p. 193) that "...concentration is the outcome of a life
cycle process in which new plants are constantly being born, existing plants
are expanding and contracting at diﬀerent rates, and a substantial number
of businesses are failing" and consider empirically what drives agglomeration
and deagglomeration. They find that (p. 200) "...new firm births and expan-
sions of existing plants have a deagglomerating eﬀect...". We provide a fiscal
competition argument that can explain this eﬀect. Third, we find that the
agglomeration advantage can intensify both countries’ incentives to charge
lower taxes.
Countries are innovative in finding arrangements to circumvent any rule
against discriminatory taxation. For instance countries often promise tax
holidays to foreign direct investors where this is legally feasible, provide in-
vesting firms with public infrastructure without charging an adequate user
fee, or sell them property or other production inputs at below market value.18
We also considered competition that includes subsidies to new FDI. If dis-
criminatory taxation is feasible, it changes the nature of the equilibrium. A
Markov perfect equilibrium emerges in which each country taxes the stock
of investment that has previously been invested in this country at its maxi-
mum. Independently of this time consistent treatment of old FDI, the coun-
tries compete in attracting new FDI. This was analysed in section 5. As a
result, agglomeration may perpetuate itself, but the economic advantage of
agglomeration may be very small.
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